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Abstract.  The effective reuse of design assets in safety-critical Software Prod-
uct Lines (SPL) would require the reuse of safety analyses of those assets in the 
variant contexts of certification of products derived from the SPL. This in turn 
requires the traceability of SPL variation across design, including variation in 
safety analysis and safety cases. In this paper, we propose a method and tool to 
support the automatic generation of modular SPL safety case architectures from 
the information provided by SPL feature modeling and model-based safety 
analysis. The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) safety case modeling notation 
and its modular extensions supported by the D-Case Editor were used to im-
plement the method in an automated tool support. The tool was used to generate 
a modular safety case for an automotive Hybrid Braking System SPL.  
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1 Introduction 
Safety cases are required by certification bodies for developing automotive, avionics, 
and railway systems. Safety standards like ISO 26262 [11] and EUROCAE ED-79A 
[6] require the use of safety cases. Software product lines (SPL) have been used in the 
development of automotive [12] and avionics [8] systems, reducing the development 
effort. Ideally, safety analysis and safety cases should be treated as reusable assets in 
safety-critical SPLs. Such reuse of pre-certified elements would reduce re-
certification effort contributing to modular and incremental certification. We refer to 
that concept as modular certification and we argue that it can provide means of deal-
ing effectively with the impact of changes caused by variation of features in products 
within a SPL. Note that modular certification has already been shown effective in 
handling changes in the certification of a system as it is updated through its life [7].  
Research in SPL provided a number of systematic approaches for managing the 
impact of variations in changing the system architecture by means of feature and con-
text models [3]. A feature model captures the main system functions offered for reuse 
in a SPL. A context model captures information about the physical, operating, sup-
port, maintenance, and regulatory environment of SPL products [9].  
Clearly, each product within a safety-critical SPL would need a safety case that re-
flects its specifics characteristics. For such safety cases to be produced efficiently, 
variation must be traced transparently in feature and context models across SPL de-
sign and safety analyses [9][10]. Information like hazards, their causes, and the allo-
cated safety requirements (derived from the hazard analysis) may change according to 
the selection of SPL variation in feature and context models in a particular product 
[9][10][12]. Such variation may also change the structure of the product safety case. 
SPL variability management tools and techniques like Hephaestus [18] and 
Pure::variants [12] can be used to manage feature and context variations in SPL de-
sign and safety analysis assets by means of definition of the configuration knowledge. 
There exist numerous methodologies and tools for semi-automated model-based 
safety analysis that can be adapted for SPL design. One of these tools, HiP-HOPS 
(Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies) [17] provides Fault 
Trees Analysis (FTA), Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and safety re-
quirements allocation information that are mostly auto-generated and could potential-
ly be used to inform a safety case. However, the direct translation of such information 
to safety arguments would very likely result in monolithic safety arguments which 
may lack structure and not help to identify the arguments and evidence for specific 
elements of the system architecture. So, while it would be useful to exploit the safety 
analysis assets provided by model-based safety analysis, one would need to find a 
‘clever’ way to argue the internal stages and nuances of the argument.  
In order to support the reuse of safety arguments, a modular SPL safety case archi-
tecture could be built in a way that reflects the typical system decomposition into 
more refined subsystems [7][12]. Thus, it would be possible to identify the properties 
(i.e. goals, sub-goals, and evidence) required by individual safety case modules. The 
establishment of a modular safety case requires the identification of boundaries (i.e. 
stopping points) in the system architecture to guide the rationale of decomposing the 
safety case into argument modules [7]. Feature and context models can provide such 
stopping points. These boundaries can be used to establish the structure of the argu-
ment modules and interdependences between them according to the following well-
established software architecture principles: High Cohesion/Low Coupling, Divide 
and Conquer, Extensibility, and Isolation of Change (i.e. Maintainability) [12]. 
GSN [16] and CAE (Claim, Argument, Evidence) [2] are two notations largely 
adopted by industry and are both applicable for modular safety cases. GSN patterns 
[13] and modular extensions [10] support the development of reusable modular safety 
case architectures. Existing safety case modeling tools such as D-Case Editor [15] and 
ACEdit [1] support GSN and its modular extensions and provide an Eclipse-based 
graphical editor. Particularly, D-Case implements a formal definition of safety case 
modeling language based on GSN and its extensions. 
Although earlier work has partly addressed SPL safety assessment [9] and safety 
case development [10], there is still a need to automate the traceability of SPL varia-
tion starting from architectural models to support the generation of a modular safety 
case architectures addressing product lines. In this paper we propose a novel approach 
supporting largely automated generation of modular and reusable safety arguments 
from system models and safety analyses. Section 2 presents the proposed method to 
support the generation of modular safety cases and its instantiation in a tool support, 
Section 3 discusses a case study and Section 4 presents the conclusion. 
2 The Proposed Method 
The production of a modular SPL safety case requires the traceability of SPL feature 
and context variation across architecture and safety analyses. Habli’s SPL safety 
metamodel [9] can support such traceability. It includes abstractions to represent SPL 
variation in feature and context assets and their impact on the hazards, their causes, 
and the allocated requirements. The metamodel also describes the relationships be-
tween SPL variation and assurance assets (e.g. safety argument elements in GSN). 
The provision of automated support for this metamodel can facilitate the automatic 
generation of modular product line safety cases. In the following we present a method 
to create support for automatic generation of modular safety cases from a number of 
inputs which include: the SPL safety metamodel [9], the safety case modeling nota-
tion metamodel (e.g., D-Case [15] GSN metamodel) and safety case patterns [13][19].  
The safety metamodel specifies core and variant system and contextual assets. It al-
so captures the association between functional, architectural, and component-level 
failures with specific SPL assets specified in the product line context, feature and 
reference architecture models. These relationships are captured in a Functional Failure 
Model (FFM), an Architectural Failure Model (AFM), and a Component Failure 
Model (CFM). The three models support explicit traceability between development 
and safety assessment assets. The FFM captures the impact of contextual and func-
tional (i.e. feature) variation on the SPL functional failure conditions, their effects, 
and allocated safety requirements. The AFM records the impact of contextual and 
design variation on the SPL architectural failure modes and safety requirements. The 
AFM also produces the failure mode causal chain and derived safety requirements 
contributing to the functional failure conditions previously captured in the FFM. Fi-
nally, the CFM records the impact of design variation on component failure modes, 
their effects, and means of mitigation (i.e. specific safety requirements). Details of 
these models can be found in [9]. In our approach, model-based development, safety 
analysis, and SPL variability management tools provide the information required to 
instantiate the SPL safety assessment metamodels. The modeling and analysis infra-
structure of such tools, together with the D-Case GSN metamodel, and safety case 
patterns [13][19] are then used to auto-generate SPL modular safety cases.  
Fig. 1 presents the structure of the proposed method in an UML activity diagram. 
Functional Failure Modeling requires the feature/instance model (i.e. FM or IM), and 
the system model (SMDL) as inputs to produce instances of FFMs. The Design of 
Modular Safety Case step requires the following inputs: FFMs, the SPL feature model 
(FM), Safety Case Modeling Notation and its metamodel to produce the structure of 
the safety case architecture. Architectural Failure Modeling requires the FFMs pro-
duced in the earlier step, fault trees (FTA) and requirements allocation (RAL) infor 
 Fig. 1. Method to support automated construction of modular product line safety cases. 
mation provided by model-based safety analysis to generate instances of AFMs. 
Component Failure Modeling requires FMEA information provided by model-based 
safety analysis as input, producing instances of CFMs as outputs. Finally, the Argu-
ment Module Design step generates the internal details of each argument module of 
the safety case architecture from the information provided by AFMs, CFMs, safety 
case architecture, Safety Case Modeling Notation and its metamodel.  
A tool architecture was developed to support the method presented in Fig. 1 and it 
is illustrated on Fig. 2. Certain SPL assets provide inputs in this architecture instanti-
ating FFM, AFM, and CFM models: the system model annotated with safety/hazard 
analysis data provided by the MATLAB/Simulink and HiP-HOPS (i.e. SMDL in Fig. 
2); the feature model (FM), the instance model (IM), and configuration knowledge 
(CK) provided by the Hephaestus/Simulink variability management tool; and the fault 
trees (FTA), FMEA, and requirements allocation (i.e., RAL) generated by HiP-HOPS. 
The D-Case GSN metamodel and safety case patterns were used to organize the struc-
ture of the modular safety case and product-based arguments for each SPL feature and 
its variation. It is important to highlight that other tools can be used to develop other 
instances of a similar tool support. The method presented in Fig. 1 is general and can 
be applied manually or with the use of a set of different tools. The specific set of tools 
used in this paper is discussed below. 
  
 
 
Fig. 2. Modular product line safety case tooling support. 
2.1 Functional, Architectural, and Component Failure Modeling 
A product line variability management tool, in this case Hephaestus/Simulink [18], 
provides the specification of the SPL feature model (or instance model in product 
derivation), and the configuration knowledge, i.e., it describes the mapping between 
SPL features, and the design elements of the system model by associating component 
identifiers with feature expressions. A model-based development environment, in this 
case MATLAB/Simulink, provides the specification of the design elements of the 
system architecture. HiP-HOPS [17] was used in this work to annotate the system 
model with hazard/safety analysis information describing the system hazards, their 
causes, allocated  safety requirements, and the failure logic of each design element. 
To obtain the necessary information for mapping SPL features, system model ele-
ments, and hazard/safety analysis data in the tool support, parsers were implemented 
for the SPL feature model (FMIMParsers), and configuration knowledge (CKParser) 
using the Java XStream
1
 XML library. A Simulink parser for Java
2
 was used to obtain 
information about the structure of the system model and its safety annotations. From 
the information provided by these parsers, the mapping between SPL features, design 
elements, and hazards is obtained by instantiating FFMs. This information is further 
used to provide instances for the SPL functional failure model (FFMPackage).  
The HiP-HOPS tool provides fault trees, FMEA analysis, and allocation of safety 
requirements to architectural modules in the form of Safety Integrity Levels (in this 
case Automotive SILs or ASILs as our case study in an automotive system) in a XML 
file. This file contains the information about the failure mode causal chain of each 
SPL hazard, and the requirements allocated to each failure mode involved in the caus-
                                                          
1
XStream: http://xstream.codehaus.org/ 
2
Simulink Library for Java: https://www.cqse.eu/en/products/simulink-library-for-java/overview/ 
al chain. The mapping between features, system model elements, and system hazards 
obtained in FFM is used together with HiP-HOPS analyses to instantiate the product 
line AFM. Parsers were developed to manipulate the fault trees (FTAParser) and re-
quirements allocation (RALParser) generated by HiP-HOPS. These parsers are used 
together with the mapping between features and Simulink model elements to instanti-
ate the SPL architectural failure model (AFMPackage). 
CFM complements the product line AFM with a component-level view of the fail-
ure behavior of the system. CFM describes the local effects of a component failure 
mode, i.e. effects occurring at the boundary of the component, typically its outputs. 
FMEA generated by tools like HiP-HOPS provides the information required to instan-
tiate the CFM. The developed tool reads this information (via FMEAParser) and in-
stantiates the CFM elements (CFMPackage).  
2.2 Design of Modular Safety Case Architecture 
We describe how to represent the SPL variation expressed in the feature model using 
modular GSN [16], and how to use the D-Case tool GSN metamodel to design the 
architecture of a modular safety case. Czarnecki et al. [3] have provided abstractions 
to represent relationships between features such as inclusive-or (1-n), exclusive-or (1-
1) features, and exclusive-or with sub-features (0-n). Fig. 3 shows how to specify 
variation expressed in the feature model into the design of a GSN modular safety 
case. Argument modules arguing the safety of mandatory features (Fig. 3a) is ex-
pressed by a top-level argument module connected to a module ‘A’ via the ‘supported 
by’ relationship (Fig. 3b). The multiplicity of such arguments capturing multiple oc-
currences of a mandatory feature can be represented by means of the ‘supported by’ 
relationship with a filled circle (GSN multiplicity). An argument module arguing the 
safety of an SPL optional feature (Fig. 3c) is represented in GSN by connecting the 
top-level argument to the optional module ‘B’ using the ‘supported by’ relationship 
with an empty circle (Fig. 3d). Argument modules arguing the safety of SPL features 
involved in inclusive-or (at least 1), exclusive-or (0 or n), or exclusive-or (1 of n) with 
grouping relationships (e.g., Fig. 3e) is encapsulated in GSN contracts (Fig 3f). The 
GSN optionality extension (i.e. choice) is used to connect the contract module to each 
argument module involved in a grouping relationship. Safety case modeling tools 
such as the Eclipse-based D-Case Editor [15] and ACEdit [1] provide implementa-
tions for the GSN metamodel, covering its patterns and modular extensions [16]. In 
the implementation of the method in the tool presented on Fig. 2, the D-Case GSN 
metamodel (i.e., Safety Case Modeling Notation and Metamodel) was used for devel-
oping the mechanism to automatically generate a modular safety case architecture. 
Initially, the tool (i.e., MSCDPackage) generates a top-level argument for the root 
feature, i.e., the feature representing the product line. Next, argument modules are 
created for each mandatory, optional, and grouping of features. The heuristics pre-
sented in Fig. 3 have also been applied to generate the structure of the modular safety 
case. Thus, an argument module has been created for the root feature of a group. This 
module is further connected to a GSN contract that encapsulates optional and alterna-
tive argument modules from the root argument module. At the end, a modular safety 
case reflecting the product line feature model decomposition is obtained. 
 
Fig. 3. Variability modeling in modular GSN and HBS-SPL feature model. 
2.3 Argument Module Design 
This step delivers the internal structure of each argument module arguing the safety of 
SPL features and their variants. The mapping between SPL features, architecture, 
component and safety analysis data provided by functional, architectural, and compo-
nent failure models is used to auto-generate the claims that compose feature-specific 
safety arguments. All these information together with the D-Case GSN metamodel are 
used as input for implementing the mechanism to auto-generate the internal structure 
of feature-specific argument modules in the tool support (i.e., AMDPackage). The 
Hazard Avoidance pattern [13] and Weaver’s ‘Component Contributions to System 
Hazards’ pattern catalogue [19] have also been used to structure each feature-specific 
argument. Specifically, the Hazard Avoidance pattern is used to decompose the argu-
ment over the mitigation of system hazards associated to a particular feature. The 
Component Contributions to System Hazards pattern catalogue is used to decompose 
the arguments over the mitigation of the system hazards into arguments arguing the 
mitigation of each component failure mode contributing to the failure of a feature.  
The relationships between SPL features, hazards, and allocated safety requirements 
provided by the functional failure model were used for arguing the mitigation of the 
system hazards associated with each SPL feature. The relationships between failure 
mode causal chains and design assets captured in the AFM, and the relationships be-
tween components, failure modes, and effects captured in the CFM have been used 
for arguing the mitigation of each component failure mode associated to a particular 
feature. 
3 Case Study 
The method and tool developed in this work was used for auto-generating a modular 
safety case architecture for a Hybrid Braking System automotive product line (HBS-
SPL). The HBS-SPL is a prototype automotive braking system SPL designed in 
MATLAB/Simulink. HBS-SPL is meant for electrical vehicles integration, in particu-
lar for propulsion architectures that integrate one electrical motor per wheel [5]. The 
term hybrid comes from the fact that braking is achieved throughout the combined 
action of the electrical In-Wheel Motors (IWMs) and frictional Electromechanical 
Brakes (EMBs). One of the key features of this system is that the integration of IWM 
in the braking process allows an increase in the vehicle’s range: while braking, IWMs 
work as generators and transform the vehicles kinetic energy into electrical energy 
that is fed into the powertrain battery. IWMs have, however, braking torque availabil-
ity limitations at high wheel speeds or when the powertrain battery is close to full 
state of charge. EMBs provide the torque needed to match the total braking demand. 
HBS-SPL components can be combined in different ways according to the constraints 
specified in the HBS-SPL feature model presented in Fig. 3g. The feature model was 
designed using the cardinality-based notation [3] and the FMP
3
 modeling tool. The 
HBS-SPL feature model includes wheel braking alternative features: Brake_Unit1 and 
Brake_Unit2 front wheels braking, Brake_Unit3 and Brake_Unit4 rear wheels brak-
ing aimed to provide the braking for each wheel. The Hephaestus/Simulink variability 
management tool was used to manage the variation in HBS-SPL design and safety 
analysis assets. Thus, the mapping between SPL features and these assets has been 
specified in the configuration knowledge. 
3.1 HBS-SPL Hazard Analysis 
SPL hazard analysis was performed in HiP-HOPS from the perspective of the follow-
ing product configurations: HBS four wheel braking (i.e. all product line presented in 
Figure 3g) (HBS-4WB); HBS front wheel braking (HBS-FWB), which includes 
Brake_Unit1 and Brake_Unit2 features; and HBS rear wheel braking (HBS-RWB) 
that includes Brake_Unit3 and Brake_Unit4 features. Table 1 presents the identified 
hazards for each SPL usage scenario and their allocated ASILs. Some of these haz-
ards are common between all HBS-SPL products and some of them are product-
specific (e.g., ‘No braking four wheels’). The ‘Value braking’ hazard is common 
across HBS-SPL products, but its causes and allocated ASILs are different in each 
product. Such variation can affect the product-specific fault trees, FMEA, and ASIL 
allocation generated by HiP-HOPS, and the structure of the product line safety case. 
Thus, the impact of SPL variation in safety analysis assets is stored and managed in 
our tool by means of SPL functional, architectural, and component failure models. 
Table 1 – HBS-SPL hazard analysis.  
Scenario Hazard ASIL 
HBS-4WB No braking four wheels D 
No braking rear C 
Value braking C 
HBS-FWB No braking front D 
Value braking D 
HBS-RWB No braking rear D 
Value braking D 
                                                          
3 FMP feature modeling tool: http://sourceforge.net/projects/fmp/ 
3.2 HBS-SPL Safety Case Architecture 
The SPL safety case architecture generated by the tool is illustrated in Fig. 4. The 
system boundaries specified in the feature model, and the information provided by 
product line FFM, AFM, and CFM were the inputs required by the tool. The figure 
presents the structure of the HBS-SPL modular safety case architecture in a GSN 
modular view organized according to the functional decomposition specified in the 
feature model of Fig. 3g. Mandatory, optional, and alternative feature/variation-
specific argument modules are organized according to GSN variability modeling ab-
stractions described on Fig. 3. These abstractions translate the representation of varia-
tion in feature model to variation in the safety case architecture.  
The top-level argument module is supported by ‘Auxiliary_Battery’, ‘Power-
train_Battery’, ‘Mechanical_Pedal’, ‘Electronic_Pedal’, and ‘Communication’ mod-
ules (denoted by ‘supported by’ relationships between the top-level module and these 
argument modules). ‘Communication’ argument module is supported by two argu-
ment modules arguing the safety of the ‘Bus_1’ and ‘Bus_2’ redundant features. 
‘Wheel_Braking’ is a mandatory argument module supported by ‘Brake_Unit1’, 
‘Brake_Unit2’, ‘Brake_Unit3’, and ‘Brake_Unit4’ alternative wheel braking argu-
ment modules encapsulated in the ‘WB_Contract’ module. The internal structure of 
the feature/variation-specific argument modules generated by the tool decomposes the 
argument over the safety of each feature into references to arguments modules (i.e. 
using GSN Away Goals)  arguing the mitigation of the system hazards  associated 
with that feature using the Hazard Avoidance pattern [13]. For example, the 
‘Brake_Unit1’ argument module is decomposed into the ‘No_Brake_4W’, and 
‘Val_Braking’, alternative hazard mitigation argument modules (Fig. 5a). Each one of 
these modules is further decomposed into argument modules arguing the mitigation of 
 
Fig 4. HBS-SPL modular safety case architecture. 
component faults contributing to a system hazard. Fig. 4b shows the ‘Val_Braking’ 
hazard argument. This argument is decomposed into modules arguing the mitigation 
of WNC and IWB component failure modes that should be addressed to minimize the 
hazard effects in a particular product. The selection of these argument modules is 
dependent upon the product definition and its operational environment. It may change 
the values for argument parameters (Fig. 5) changing the structure of the product 
argument. SPL hazard analyses provide the information required for these parameters. 
By analyzing the structure of the argument modules we have identified the im-
portance of the context in the argument structure to encapsulate the variation in prod-
uct definition (i.e. feature selection) and its operational environment (i.e. context se-
lection) at system (i.e. functional) level argumentation. So, the selection of these ele-
ments may change the structure of a product-specific modular safety case architec-
ture. At the architectural level argumentation, context is used to encapsulate the varia-
tion in the hazards, their top-level failure conditions, and the allocated safety require-
ments that are subject to change according to the product definition and context speci-
fied at system level argument. Finally, at the component level, the context is used to 
encapsulate the variation in the component failure modes and safety integrity levels 
allocated to these failure modes. 
The structure of this modular safety case architecture has increased the reusability 
of safety arguments arguing the safety of variable SPL features. The safety case archi-
tecture reflects the decomposition of the system grouping feature-specific safety ar-
guments into cohesive and low-coupled modules. Variable argument modules such as 
‘Brake_Unit1’ and ‘Brake_Unit4’ are encapsulated in a contract module. Thus, the 
impact of the variation on the selection of these argument modules in a product-
specific safety case is isolated from reusable argument structures. 
 
Fig. 5. Brake_Unit1 and hazard arguments. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed a method describing the design and implementation of a 
tool that supports the automated generation of a modular product line safety case ar-
chitecture from outputs provided by model-based development, safety analysis, and 
variability management tools. The SPL safety case architecture generated in this ap-
proach is organized into modules reflecting the feature and component boundaries. 
This architecture has the potential to increase the reuse of safety arguments across 
SPL products, which is the main novelty of our approach compared with current re-
search on safety cases. The feasibility of the approach was tested in a small case 
study, but we are aware that more work is needed to assess the value and limitations 
of this work and the acceptability of the resultant modular safety cases. It might be the 
case that only partial argument structures can be constructed using this approach and 
such structures may need significant intervention by experts to create convincing 
safety arguments. Further work focuses on evaluating the quality of safety case archi-
tectures generated by the proposed method against traditional software metrics like 
coupling and cohesion. 
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